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Abstract 
 
This Article focuses on the problem of transfer pricing from an international taxation perspective. It 
elaborates two major points using game theory as a theoretical framework. First, it argues that both developed 
and developing countries are facing the same fundamental problem in the transfer pricing arena; the meaning 
of the arm’s length standard (ALS) is increasingly unknowable because of the absence of transfer pricing case 
law with public good features. Second, this Article proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem within 
the ALS framework. The proposal consists of a procedural, rather than a substantive, system in which 
multilateral advance pricing agreements (APAs) are used to produce a proxy for case law with public good 
features. The proposal is arguably superior to other options (such as formulary apportionment and 
consolidated base taxation approach elaborated by the European Commission in 2001) because it can be 
applied by both developed and developing countries and is consistent with the current structure of 
international taxation. The proposal has been written to facilitate its addition to Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.  
 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. I have benefited from comments on previous 
drafts of this Article by Benjamin Alarie, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Richard Bird, Yariv Brauner, David Duff, 
Marcelo Ferrante, Edward Iacobucci, Emiliano Marambio Catán, Eduardo Rivera López, Thomas Ulen, Lode 
Vereeck, and participants in workshops at the University of Toronto, University of California at Berkeley, and 
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Law Schools. All errors are my own responsibility.   
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4I- Introduction 
 
The world has experienced two globalization booms and one bust over the past two 
centuries. The first boom started about 1820, and lasted until the advent of World War I. 
The second began at the end of World War II and has continued since.  The interwar years 
witnessed a retreat from this otherwise continuous shift towards greater global integration. 2 
 
One major consequence of the globalization movement was the emergence in the late 19th 
century of a novel strategic problem among nations: how to divide the international tax 
base in the absence of a centralized authority.  Developed countries eventually reached a 
fundamental consensus on how to solve this problem.3 That consensus is currently 
embodied in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.  The OECD model is the foundation of a 
network of over 2500 bilateral tax treaties. This network is referred to as the “international 
tax regime.”4
The OECD model is largely based on a web of standards (rather than rules) whose precise 
meaning can be determined with certainty ex post via case law.5 In effect, key norms of the 
 
2 Jeffrey G. Williamson, Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization (NBER Working Paper N° 
9161, 1992), at http://post.econom-ics.harvard.edu/faculty/jwilliam/papers/w9161.pdf (last visited December 
14, 2003). 
3This consensus was suggested in the seminal Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 
F. 19 (1923). 
4 The literature on the international tax regime is broad and deep; only certain elements can be highlighted 
here. Excellent recent surveys of the entire international tax regime are the following: Yariv Brauner, An 
International Tax Regime in Crystallization — realities, experiences and opportunities, 56 Tax Law Review 
259 (2003). Brauner outlines a general conceptual framework for achieving a world tax regime via a 
multilateral tax treaty that might be implemented in stages. Ian Roxan, Limits to Globalization — Some 
implications for taxation in the developing world (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Roxan 
does not share the negative view of the effects of globalization on taxation in the developing world. Michael 
Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 
54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001), which argues that the current international income tax regime lacks a 
satisfactory normative basis. Richard Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax, in Tax Law Design and 
Drafting, (International Monetary Fund, Volume 2, 719-810, 1998). Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of 
International Taxation: a Proposal for Simplification, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1996), which, as its title 
indicates, identifies the structure of international taxation and its normative underpinnings. Sol Piccioto, 
International Business Taxation, A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation (1992), which is 
an historical account of the evolution of corporate income taxation. Adrian Ogley, The Principles of 
International Tax: a Multinational Perspective (1993), which provides a brief and illuminating general 
overview. The literature of international taxation and game theory produced by international lawyers is small. 
Seminal papers in this area are the following: Charles Kingston, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 
Columbia Law Review 1151 (1981) (arguing that tax systems do interact and the implications of this; he 
maintains that the main players of the international tax game are countries and that countries compete for 
revenues, investments, markets, and jobs); Tsilly Dagan, National Interests in the International Tax Game, 18 
Virginia Tax Review 363 (1998) (arguing that countries play as self-interested players in the international tax 
game; footnote 40 of Dagan’s paper maintains that the international tax game is a repeated game played 
infinitely).   
5 See Part II.2. Ronald Dworkin seems to have been the first author to distinguish between rules and standards 
from a philosophical perspective. Dworkin made this distinction in the context of his critique of the H.L.A. 
Hart’s book The Concept of Law. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Chapter 2, Harvard 
5OECD model do not have precise meanings before the taxpayer acts; rather, the precise 
meaning can be determined only after the taxpayer acts on a case-by-case basis.6 The 
central role of the OECD model is to minimize international double taxation by establishing 
some structural legal fictions to guide the division of the international income tax base.7
The international taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is a case in point. Since 
about 1928, developed countries created by consensus the legal fiction of the separate entity 
approach according to which the different profit units of a given MNE should be deemed 
independent enterprises. For example, pursuant to the OECD model, IBM (the parent 
company based in the US) and each of its subsidiaries (based in a number of other 
countries) should be considered to be separate taxpayers for the purposes of national 
corporate income taxes, rather than one global taxpayer. 
 
Developed countries also agreed that the fiction of the separate entity approach should be 
enforced via the arm’s length standard (ALS).8 The ALS provides that national tax 
jurisdiction over income produced by an MNE should be allocated among countries on the 
basis of how comparable non-associated enterprises would have realized income in 
comparable circumstances. For example, the ALS provides that the transfer pricing agreed 
by IBM and one of its subsidiaries (based, say, in Singapore) of a certain type of hardware 
must be consistent with the market price of a comparable type of hardware that independent 
companies would agree to in similar circumstances. If the ALS is not met in a given case, 
national tax authorities are normally vested with the power to adjust the transfer pricing of 
associated enterprises to make it consistent with the ALS.  
 
The concept of associated enterprises, a structural element of the ALS, is standard-based 
because its meaning is uncertain ex ante.9 Scholars have devoted considerable energy to 
determining the precise meaning of associated enterprises.10 Predictably, that effort has 
 
University Press (1978). On the difference between rules and standards from a legal and economic 
perspective, see the following materials: Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 
Duke Law Journal, Vol 42:557 (1992); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic 
Analysis, 23 Journal of Legal Studies 307 (1994). Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 555-561 
(Aspen Publishers, Sixth Edition) (2003). Hans-Bernd Schafer, Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for 
Human Capital in Low-Income Countries, (July, 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).  
6 See Part II.3.  
7 Fiction normally refers to a nonrebuttable presumption. See F.H.M. Grapperhaus, The Trade-off Between 
Accuracy and Administrability, Presumptive Income Taxation, proceedings of a seminar held in New Delhi in 
1997 during the 51st Congress of the International Fiscal Association, Vol. 22d. Chair Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague-London-Boston.  
8 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration, at P-2, paragraph 6 
(1995) (OECD guidelines).  As Richard Vann argues, the ALS was firstly introduced in the context of 
permanent establishment, and it was extended latter to subsidiaries. See Richard J. Vann, Reflections on the 
Business Profits and the Arm’s Length Standard, in The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties, 133-
169, at 135 (Brian J. Arnold, et al eds., Canadian Tax Foundation, 2003). See also Taxation of Foreign and 
National Enterprises (Volume IV), Methods of Allocating Taxable Income by Mitchell B. Carroll, at 47 
(League of Nations, Geneva, 1933) (the Carroll Report). 
9 See Part II.3.  
10 See, e.g., Article 9 OECD Model Convention: What is an Associated Enterprise? 57th Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association, Sydney, Australia, Seminar G. (September 2003) <http://www.ifa.nl>.  
6been largely unsuccessful due to the lack of case law with public good features in this 
area.11 
For certain strategic reasons, developing countries of all legal traditions and cultures have 
been importing the international tax regime since the early 1960s in a systematic way. The 
adoption of the international tax regime has not been limited to open economy developing 
countries.  For example, treaties based on the OECD Model have been concluded by 
developing countries from the Islamic world (such as Iran),12 and also the communist world 
(including North Korea).13 
The massive importation of the international tax regime by developing countries has been 
problematic in areas like enforcement, as the experience of Argentina shows in the context 
of transfer pricing.14 This is due to many factors. Developing countries’ case law has less 
relevance in predicting courts’ decisions than is usually the case in the developed world. 15 
The main reasons are political instability and relatively weak observance of the rule of law. 
For instance, the members of the Argentine Supreme Court have been removed en masse 
eight times between 1946 and 2005, leading to sudden changes in the Argentine transfer 
pricing case law.16 The unstable case law implies that the precise meaning of the 
international tax regime’s standard-based norms, such as the ALS approach, for the most 
part remains unknowable in much of the developing world. 
Since the late 1970s, developed countries have also faced severe problems with the 
enforcement of the ALS. This is because the emergence of confidential advance pricing 
agreements (APAs) has made litigation rare in the context of transfer pricing.17 Moreover, 
the case law that is available is not a public good because the holdings are typically too 
 
11 Case law is a public good (rather than a private good) if it allows a representative person to predict the 
probable outcome of a future court’s decision. See James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between 
Anarchy and Leviathan (1974), chapter 6 (arguing that legal precedent is a form of social capital having 
public good characteristics). See also W. Landes and R. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 Journal of Law and Economics 249 (1976) (arguing that the body of legal precedents is a capital 
stock that yields a flow of information services).  
12See, e.g., the Austria-Iran Double Taxation Convention concluded on March 11, 2002, available in LEXIS, 
WTD File. 
13 See, e.g., the Austria-Cuba DTC concluded on June 26, 2003, and Czech Republic-North Corea signed on 
March 2, 2005, available in LEXIS, WTD File. 
14 Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: the Argentine Experience, Revista Argentina de Teoría 
Jurídica, volume 2, number 1, (November 2000).  
<http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/derecho/publicaciones/rtj1/pdf/baistrocchi.pdf>
15 See, for example, Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the US 
Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 77 (1997-1998) 
(arguing that the US Constitutional Model failed in Argentina mainly because the Argentine Supreme Court 
has been substantially inconsistent with the principle of stare decisis since the Thirties onwards). 
16 William C. Banks and Alejandro Carrió, “Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina 
and the United States,” Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 15.1, Fall 1993, 1-43 at 25. 
17 Diane M. Ring, “On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements and the 
Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation,” 21 Michigan Journal of International Law, 2000. In 
her Article, Ring makes a comprehensive description and evaluation of the U.S. APA procedure using, inter 
alia, public choice as a theoretical framework. For a global analysis of the APA process, see Jose Manuel 
Calderon, Advance Pricing Agreements. A Global Analysis, Kluwer Law International, 1998.  
7fact-specific to allow a representative taxpayer to predict the probable outcome of a future 
court’s decisions—especially when no comparables are readily available.18 
In sum, for different reasons, both the developed and developing worlds are facing the same 
fundamental problem: the meaning of the ALS is largely unknowable because of the 
absence of case law with public good features in this area. Therefore, the ALS is unable to 
provide taxpayers with a clear sense of how they are expected to behave in the legal system 
in which they operate. This scenario in part accounts for the worldwide ALS crisis.19 
As an unfortunate product of the ALS crisis, a wave of transfer pricing litigation has 
emerged in both the developed and developing worlds since the beginning of the 21st 
century.20 For example, GlaxoSmithKline, a British pharmaceutical giant, filed suit against 
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service early in 2004. With USD 5 billion at stake, it is the 
largest transfer pricing litigation in world history.21 
18 Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that the evolution of the U.S. transfer pricing case law can be summarized as 
follows. “The development of the case law under [IRC] Section 482 can generally be divided into three 
periods. The first period, from the earliest cases in the 1930s until about 1962, was characterized by a wide 
variety of interpretations of the statute, as the courts attempted to define the limits of the Commissioner’s 
authority under the very broad language of Section 482 and its predecessors. The salient characteristic of this 
period was the very gradual acceptance by the courts that the arm’s length standard, which was first included 
in the regulations promulgated in 1935, was the proper method of determining what constituted a ‘clear 
reflection of income’ of the related parties under the statutory language. The second period, from about 1962 
until about 1972, was characterized by the dominance of the arm’s length standard, as interpreted in the 1968 
Section 482 regulations, and of the three methods for defining comparables defined under those regulations 
(that is, the comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, and resale price methods). The third period, which 
lasted from approximately 1972 until the issuance of the temporary regulations in 1993, was characterized by 
the increasing difficulties encountered by the courts in finding comparables under the 1968 regulations, and 
by their increasing reliance on ‘fourth methods’ incorporating some type of profit split or similar methods.” 
Avi-Yonah summarizes the increasing problem of identifying comparables in U.S. case law as follows: “The 
problem of finding comparables can be seen if one examines the major international cases under [IRC] 
Section 482. If one takes only the cases surveyed in the White Paper (1988), plus the major cases decided 
since 1988, one finds that up to 1973, the arm’s length standard based on comparable transactions was 
employed in nine out of 14 cases (64%) cited in the White Paper. From 1974 onward, comparables were 
found only in four of 16 major cases Section 482 cases (25%); in all of these four cases (Eli Lilly, Paccar, 
U.S. Steel and Bausch & Lomb) the Service argued that the comparable was inappropriate, and with respect 
to U.S. Steel and Bausch & Lomb, attempted to reverse the result in the final regulation.” See Reuven Avi-
Yonah, Analysis of Judicial Decisions Interpreting Section 482, Tax Management, Foreign Income Portfolios,
Transfer Pricing: Judicial Strategy and Outcomes, July 2003, emphasis added, pages A-101 and A-109, 
respectively. Footnotes omitted.  
19 The worldwide crisis of the ALS has been the focus of many papers. A prominent example of those papers 
is Walter Hellerstein, Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The Case for Formulary Apportionment. As the 
title of that unpublished paper denotes, it suggests that: “If our tax rules are to reflect the underlying economic 
reality to which they apply, the arm’s-length’s-separate-geographic accounting standard will ultimately yield 
to formulary apportionment as the preferred method of income allocation in the twenty-first century.” (Walter 
Hellerstein, at 19). 
20 Transfer pricing litigation is unfortunate in the following sense. Because courts are normally unable to 
produce transfer pricing case law with public good features in this area for the reasons elaborated infra,
transfer pricing litigation does not illuminate the meaning of the ALS. See Part IV.A.2.a. 
21 Martin Sullivan, With Billions at Stake, Glaxo Puts U.S. APA Program on Trial, Tax Notes Int’l, May 3, 
2004, p. 456.  
 
8The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it seeks to provide an analysis of the problem 
faced by the ALS when the legal system in which it operates is unable to produce case law 
with public good features; that is, case law capable of providing reliable guidance with 
respect to the precise meaning of the ALS in other cases. The U.S. and Argentine expe-
riences with transfer pricing are focused on as case studies for identifying normative 
lessons. The second purpose of this Article is to suggest a procedural method for inducing 
the legal system of representative developed and developing countries to produce a proxy 
for case law in transfer pricing with public good features. The proposal is the product of six 
normative lessons that have been inferred from the U.S. and Argentine experiences in the 
enforcement of the ALS. The proposal is written to facilitate its addition to Article 9 of the 
OECD Model Tax Conventions on Income and on Capital.  
 
The suggested proposal is arguably superior to competing ones, such as formulary 
apportionment and consolidated base taxation elaborated by the European Commission on 
October 2001. This is largely because, unlike the alternative options, the procedural 
proposal can be applied readily in both the developed and developing worlds given the 
relatively minor demands it places on local institutions and human capital endowments. 
 
The Article is divided into five parts. After this introduction, Part II outlines the distinction 
between rules and standards from a law and economics perspective. It shows that the 
OECD model is primarily a standard-based (rather than a rule-based) legal framework. A 
key assumption of the OECD model is that it presupposes a decentralized network of 
domestic courts capable of producing case law with public good features for providing 
precise meanings to such a model. Finally, Part II explains how this failure to produce case 
law with public good features is at the root of the transfer pricing problem. 
 
Part III explores the normative lessons to be drawn from the Argentine and U.S. 
experiences in transfer pricing. It concludes that, for different reasons, both the developed 
and developing worlds are facing the same problem: the meaning of the ALS is largely 
unknowable because of the absence of case law with public good features in this area. 
Therefore, the key assumption of the OECD model referred to above is violated in the 
transfer pricing area. The result is that the ALS is unable to provide taxpayers with a clear 
sense of the law’s demands with regard to transfer pricing in the legal systems in which 
they operate.  
 
Part IV argues that a representative transfer pricing contest is an unsolved, one-shot 
prisoner’s dilemma between the tax authority and a taxpayer. Consequently, the parties to a 
transfer pricing case lack the incentive to provide the courts with all the available 
information critical for producing transfer pricing case law with public good features. This 
strategic scenario results in most current transfer pricing precedents being private goods: 
they are typically applicable only to the case at hand. Conversely, APAs may trigger an 
iterated (rather than a one-shot) prisoner’s dilemma between contracting states that might 
be solved spontaneously. Hence, the Article proposes that the bilateral or multilateral APA, 
provided for in Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, be applied in such a way as 
to achieve two fundamental goals: (a) to promote the emergence of tit-for-tat between 
contracting states in the transfer pricing arena; (b) to produce a proxy for case law with 
9public good features capable of providing meanings to the ALS in the wide array of 
contexts in which that standard operates, such as e-commerce and derivative financial 
instruments. Part V concludes.  
 
II- The Transfer Pricing Problem 
1- The Root of the Transfer Pricing Problem  
The rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been underway since the end of the 
nineteen-century.22 The emergence of MNEs is essentially a consequence of the relatively 
high transaction cost of certain market transactions. In effect, MNEs are a byproduct of the 
minimization of cross-border transaction costs.23 
This explanation can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose that a French 
multinational (FM) manufactures cars in France and owns a valuable intangible: know-how 
in the marketing of its cars. FM is willing to expand its business to country X, however 
intellectual property rights are not properly enforced in country X. Due to this deficient 
protection of property rights, FM decides that, instead of supplying its intangible to Indep 
Co., (an independent reseller in country X), it will create a wholly-owned subsidiary in 
country X to sell its vehicles (FM sub). Thus, this strategy allows FM to expand its business 
to country X minimizing the risk of damaging its intangible via the internalization of this 
transaction cost.24 This example shows that MNEs may be able to replace an arm’s length 
market in products and services (the external market) with an internal market of inputs.25 
This result applies generally. 
 
The external and internal markets of inputs differ at least in the following significant 
respect: the pricing mechanism applies in the former but not in the latter.26 Conversely, in 
the internal market transfer pricing is used to determine the price at which transactions are 
notionally conducted; that is, a transfer price is “…the unit price assigned to goods and 
services between the parent company and subsidiaries or between divisions within the same 
firm…”27 This difference between the internal and external markets is relevant because 
while multinationals in principle do not control market prices, they are relatively free to set 
 
22 See Picciotto, note 4. 
23 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 1937, reprinted in: The Firm, the Market and the 
Law, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 40, 33-55 (arguing that the operation of a market 
cost something and that, by forming an organization and allowing some authority (´an entrepreneur´) to direct 
the resources, certain marketing costs are saved); See also Christos N. Pielis & Roger Sugden, On the Theory 
of the Transactional Firm, 9-15 at 9, in The nature of the transnational firm (Christos N. Pielis & Roger 
Sugden eds., 1996). 
24 Another answer to the question why do MNEs exist is generally labeled the “divide and rule” approach. 
This states that some multinationals are created in order to divide its workers into country- specific groups 
and, thus, “employers improve their bargaining position and thereby gain at the expense of the worker” (See 
Sudgen, note 155, at 187-89). 
25 The external market is where interdependent activities are coordinated by the market forces rather by the 
internal market (where such activities are centrally coordinated by a firm). On the internal-external market 
distinction, see Sudgen, note 155, at 169.  
26 Robert G. Eccles, The Transfer Pricing Problem. A Theory for Practice, at 19, Lexington Books, Mass. 
(1986). 
27 André Gabor, Pricing. Concepts and methods for effective marketing, at 113-114, University Press, 
Cambridge, Great Britain (1988). 
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the transfer pricing of their intra-firm transactions. Consequently, this power may be used 
abusively.  Consider the following example.28 
In the example referred to above, FM is a manufacturer of cars, and a resident of France.  
FM Sub is its wholly owned subsidiary resident in country X and resells the cars to 
independent customers in that country. The taxable income of the subsidiary is determined 
by three variables: (i) the reselling price of the cars to independent customers; (ii) the 
expenses paid for all its inputs (except for the cars); and, (iii) the expenses incurred for 
purchasing the cars from the manufacturer. The market generally determines the first two 
variables (price of inputs from independent enterprises and price of output to independent 
costumers). Conversely, the third variable (the price paid by the subsidiary for buying the 
cars) is under the manufacturer’s control. Therefore, if the tax rate of the manufacturer’s 
jurisdiction is higher than that of its subsidiary, then the manufacturer can charge the lowest 
possible transfer price to its subsidiary in order to channel the profits of the multinational 
enterprise to the manufacturer’s jurisdiction. On the contrary, if the tax rate applicable to 
the manufacturer is lower than that of its subsidiary, the manufacturer can charge the 
highest possible price to its subsidiary. The net effect of this transfer pricing strategy is to 
increase the global after-tax return of the MNE.29 
Transfer pricing manipulation produces two major consequences. Firstly, as the last 
example shows, it puts national tax jurisdictions under stress because it is an income-
shifting system that allows MNEs to maximize after-tax profits by channeling taxable 
income to lower-tax jurisdictions. Secondly, it raises horizontal equity issues on the basis 
that it provides a substantial advantage to MNEs in comparison with non-MNEs; only the 
former can use this type of international tax planning strategy. 
 
Since 1915, when the U.K. implemented the first regulations on transfer pricing, tax 
jurisdictions have been exploring ways to curb transfer pricing abuses in order to minimize 
the consequences pointed out in the previous paragraph.30 From this exploration two 
different anti-avoidance mechanisms have emerged. They are the opposite ends of a 
continuum.31 On the one hand, the ALS that enjoys a fairly wide international consensus 
and is backed by the OECD. On the other hand, there is global formulary apportionment 
(GFA). Although GFA was initially rejected by the OECD,32 it has more recently been 
gaining some guarded support from the OECD.33 Both anti-avoidance mechanisms can be 
summarized as follows. 
 
28 Transfer pricing is not only a tool for minimizing the tax liability of MNEs. It is also instrumental for 
MNEs to evaluate the performance of their own profit-centers (see 1995 OECD Report at I-2). 
29 This example has been based upon that developed in Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Rise and the Fall of the 
Arm’s Length: a Study in the evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89-75, at 89 (Summer 
1995). A similar example may be found in Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 
Blackwell, Oxford U.K. & Cambridge, at 289 (1995). 
30 Herbert Bettinger Barrios, Precios de Transferencia. Sus Efectos Fiscales, Ediciones Fiscales ISEF, S.A. 
Mexico (1996).   
31 See Avi-Yonah, note 29 (arguing that the profit split method is somewhere between the ALS and the 
formulary apportionment continuum).  
32 1995 OECD Guidelines III-19/24. 
33 See note 49. 
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The ALS attempts to replicate the “… the working of the open market in cases where goods 
and services are transferred between associated enterprises…”.34 Hence, the ALS requires a 
multinational to set the transfer prices of its internal transactions as if they were entered by 
independent parties in similar circumstances. If a given transaction does not pass this 
standard, tax authorities are generally empowered to adjust the transfer prices in order to 
achieve consistency.35 
By contrast, the GFA method allocates the global profit of a MNE on a consolidated basis 
on the grounds of a predetermined formula.36 Therefore, GFA disregards both the separate 
entity approach to MNE and the transactions entered into among their constituent business 
units. It is used principally by some countries’ political subdivision such as the U.S. States 
and Canadian provinces.37 The European Commission has recently suggested a GFA 
method for Europe.38 
Neither the ALS as currently embodied in the OECD Model, nor the GFA provide 
satisfactory answers to the central issue of how to divide the international tax base among 
different tax jurisdictions. Two reasons explain this unsatisfactory scenario. On the one 
hand, the ALS is unworkable when courts are unable to produce case law with public good 
features.39 On the other hand, the GFA has a clear meaning but, unfortunately, it cannot be 
applied in both the developed and developing worlds because the GFA presupposes 
elements (such as common accounting standards) that are not met in both worlds.40 In sum, 
both the ALS and global formulary apportionment suffer structural problems when applied 
to developed and developing countries. This is why the transfer pricing problem will most 
likely remain a contentious international tax issue for the foreseeable future. 
 
2- Standards versus Rules: An Economic Analysis41 
Legal systems must provide information about the legal norms applicable in a given 
society. Interestingly, the government can give content to legal norms ex ante (via rules) or 
ex post (via standards).  Examples of rules and standards can be found in many settings. For 
instance, a norm demanding “no driving in excess of 55 miles per hour” is a rule because its 
meaning is precise before an individual drives her vehicle. Conversely, the norm “drive 
carefully” is a standard because its meaning can be determined ex post via case law only (or 
by something functionally equivalent to case law).  Rules and standards differ in at least 
three important dimensions: (i) cost structure; (ii) distribution of power within a legal 
system; and (iii) institutional assumptions. Those three dimensions will be addressed 
independently. 
 
34 1995 OECD Guidelines, at I-6. 
35 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, June 1998, second paragraph of Article 9 (1). 
36 1995 OECD Report, III.19. 
37 See Part IV.C.2. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See Part II. 2 and 3. 
40 See Part IV.C. 
41 This section is closely based on the following Articles: Kaplow Louis, Rules versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 22 Duke Law Journal 557 (1992); Kaplow, Louis, The Value of Accuracy in 
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 Journal of Legal Studies 307 (1994). 
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First, rules and standards have different costs of promulgation (i.e. the expenses incurred in 
the creation of a norm) and enforcement (i.e. the cost arising from applying a norm to a 
given set of facts). Rules are normally associated with high promulgation costs and low 
enforcement costs. An example of a rule is a detailed and precise tax norm that clearly 
specifies ex ante the taxpayer’s expected behaviour. Hence, rules are expensive to create, 
but relatively cheap to apply given their largely self-enforcing character. On the other hand, 
standards are normally associated with low promulgation costs and high enforcement costs. 
An instance of a standard is the ALS. Its meaning can only be provided ex post via case 
law. Therefore, the enforcement cost of standards is high vis-à-vis its promulgation cost. 
 
Second, rules and standards imply differing institutional allocations of power. While rules 
are usually a centralised creation of the legislative branch of government, standards are a 
decentralised creation of the law through, paradigmatically, the judiciary. 
 
Finally, standards and rules have different institutional assumptions. Standards (unlike 
rules) presuppose a legal system capable of producing case law with public good features. 
Standards therefore require a higher threshold of human capital endowments than rules 
within the legal system in which they operate (such as competent lawyers and judges). 
 
A main criterion for choosing among rules or standards is the frequency with which a legal 
norm is applicable in a given society. Louis Kaplow maintains that rules should be 
preferred in cases of frequent behaviours because the relatively high cost of promulgation is 
off-set by a relatively low cost of enforcement. Conversely, standards should be preferred 
for infrequent behaviour in order to defer the main cost to the time of enforcement.  
 
3- The OECD Model: A Standard-Based Regulatory Model  
 
This section identifies the structure of the OECD model using the rule/standard distinction 
as a theoretical framework. It argues that the central norms of the OECD model are 
fundamentally standards-based (rather than rules-based). That is, the full meaning of the 
central norms of the OECD model can be provided ex post by case law only. Articles 9.1 
and 3.2 are used as examples for grounding this proposition. 
 
a- The Cases of Articles 3.2 and 9.1: A Standard-based Norms 
 
The OECD model regulates the transfer pricing problem through two separate provisions. 
Article 7 addresses that problem in the context of permanent establishments, whereas 
Article 9.1 is focused on the transfer pricing problem in the context of associated 
enterprises. Article 9.1 states the following: 
 
Associated Enterprises  
1. Where  
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or b) the 
same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise 
of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions 
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are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which 
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed ac-
cordingly.  
 
Article 9.1 embodies a norm that has the following logical structure: 
 
1) If associated enterprises conclude a transfer price; 
2) And that transfer price is not consistent with the ALS; then 
3) The tax authority may adjust that transfer price to make it consistent with the ALS. 
 
Interestingly, the OECD model does not provide an ex ante meaning for two 
fundamental elements of Article 9.1. Indeed, neither “associated enterprise” nor “ALS” 
is defined by the OECD model.  Article 3.2 governs those cases of terms not defined by 
the OECD model in order to solve the interpretative problem of norms without ex ante 
meaning. Article 3.2 states the following: 
 
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting 
State, any term not defined there in shall, unless the context otherwise 
requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State 
for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning 
under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to 
the term under other laws of that State. 
 
The logical structure of Article 3.2 is the following: 
 
1) If a term is not defined in the OECD model; 
2) And the context does not otherwise require; then 
3) The meaning of that term will be provided by domestic law of Contracting States. 
 
Article 3.2 of the OECD model has a mixed character. It consists of a rule embedded in a 
standard. In effect, the rule (“undefined terms must be defined by contracting states’ 
domestic law”) is subject to the standard (“unless the context otherwise requires”). Article 
3.2 has, therefore, a prevailing standard-based nature because only case law can provide a 
meaning to the standard “unless the context otherwise requires.” In sum, both Article 9.1 
and Article 3.2 have standard-based (rather than rule-based) structure because they lack a 
precise ex ante meaning.  
 
b- Main Assumption of the OECD Model: a Decentralised Network of Domestic Courts 
Capable of Producing Case Law with Public Good Features  
 
The previous Section has shown that two of the main norms of the OECD model (i.e.  
Articles 3.2 and 9.1) have standard-based features. Other prominent examples of OECD 
norms that have standard-based nature include the following for reasons similar to those 
identified when analysing Articles 3.2 and 9.1: agent of independent status (Article 5.6), 
beneficial owner (Articles 10, 11 and 12), and royalties (Article 12).  
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The standard-based structure of the OECD model is meaningful. It suggests that the OECD 
model is grounded on a crucial institutional assumption. In effect, the OECD model 
assumes that the content of its norms will be fundamentally provided by a network of 
decentralised domestic courts via case law with public good character. Unfortunately, for 
the reasons stated in Part IV below, this assumption of the OECD model is not met with 
respect to the ALS. 
 
III-Drawing Normative Lessons from the Argentine and U.S. Experiences in Transfer 
Pricing 
 
This Part identifies six central normative lessons of the U.S. and Argentine experiences in 
transfer pricing. The lessons derived from two recent Articles, one American and one 
Argentinean, are the following.42 
(1) One recurring question on how legal regulations should be formulated in a legal system 
involves whether regulations should take the form of rules or standards. The policy option 
that is central to this question is whether the content of the law should be determined and 
announced in advance in a rule or left to an adjudicator in a standard. This distinction is 
relevant in transfer pricing because the ALS is a standard; its precise meaning can only be 
determined ex post via case law with public good features (or by something functionally 
equivalent to case law). 
 
(2) The ALS faces a problem when the legal system in which it works is unable to produce 
case law with public good features. In such legal systems there is little or no information 
capable of guiding taxpayers on how they are expected to behave in transfer pricing. This 
problem is common to both developed and developing countries. On the one hand, 
developed countries face the problem because, for certain strategic reasons explored below, 
reported decisions are infrequent. Moreover, the limited case law available is not a public 
good; the holdings typically are too fact-specific for predicting the probable outcome of 
future court decisions. This scenario makes the meaning of the ALS difficult to determine 
— especially when no comparables are available. On the other hand, developing countries 
face a similar problem, but for an additional reason — their weak rule of law and political 
 
42 These Articles are the following: Reuven S. Avi-Yonah — “The Rise and Fall of the Arm’s Length: A 
Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,” University of Virginia School of Law, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 
89 (1995); Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: the Argentine Experience, Revista Argentina 
de Teoría Jurídica, volume 2, number 1, (November 2000).  
<http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/derecho/publicaciones/rtj1/pdf/baistrocchi.pdf>
Baistrocchi´s Article is focused on the Argentine experience on transfer pricing since 1932 (when the federal 
income tax was introduced) onwards. It explores the evolution of Argentine transfer pricing regulations and 
their judicial enforcement at both the domestic and tax treaty levels. He offers two main conclusions. First, 
the evolution of the Argentine version of the ALS is, particularly since the 1990´s, towards an increasing 
consistency with the ALS as defined by public customary international law (which is, in turn, greatly 
influenced by the OECD). Second, both the Argentine Supreme Court and Congress (or the body in charge of 
enacting laws during military regimes) have normally attempted to mutate the standard nature of the ALS into 
a rule based norm, occasionally with procedural features, in the arena of frequent cross-border transactions 
(such as exports of commodities). This trend towards providing an ex ante meaning to the ALS (via 
transforming a standard into a rule) can be explained as an attempt of minimizing the enforcement cost of the 
ALS. 
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instability produce frequent violations of stare decisis, making case law an unreliable 
source for predicting court decisions.43 In sum, the meaning of the ALS is largely 
unknowable throughout the world for the same reason: the lack of transfer pricing case law 
with public good features.  
 
(3) Because the meaning of the ALS is largely unknowable, an average taxpayer typically 
incurs avoidable costs to learn how he or she is expected to behave in the area of transfer 
pricing. An example of an avoidable cost can be found in the Glaxo case. The precise 
meaning of the ALS in Glaxo could have been identified in a more efficient way than 
litigation.44 
(4) Each time the transfer pricing problem was high on the Argentine agenda, the Congress 
or the Supreme Court implicitly transformed the ALS into a set of rule-based norms when 
the transactions involved were frequent. The prohibition of deduction of royalty payments 
to non-resident associated enterprises is a case in point. This implicit transformation of a 
standard into a rule was probably geared toward minimizing the enforcement cost of the 
ALS. 
 
(5) In a politically unstable context, procedural rule-based norms have been less volatile 
than standard-based norms in transfer pricing. That is probably because rule-based norms 
(especially those that have a procedural feature) tend to be perceived as ideologically 
neutral by local actors in the political process. For example, a procedural rule-based norm 
introduced in 1942 into the Argentine income tax system to deter transfer pricing abuses in 
the import and export of agricultural products lasted 61 years without major changes. The 
stability of that procedural rule-based norm is remarkable because of the unstable political 
context in which it operated: Argentina faced five revolutions from 1942 to 2003.45 
(6) The legal system of a representative developing country typically has a relatively low 
human capital endowment. This suggests that the legal systems of developing countries will 
frequently encounter difficulties when enforcing standards because standards, unlike rules, 
presuppose a decentralized network of competent and well educated lawyers and judges.46 
43 See footnote 15. 
44 The facts of the Glaxo case and reasons for that statement are elaborated in Part IV.A.8. 
45 For an excellent book on the history of Argentina, see Luis Alberto Romero & James Brennan, A History of 
Argentina in the Twentieth Century, Penn State University Press (2002).  The Argentine revolutions referred 
to above were mostly implemented by non-elected military governments. 
46 The OECD acknowledges that the ALS presupposes highly trained personnel who are not available in many 
countries. According to the OECD, “during the 1980s, much of the developed world opposed the use of 
worldwide unitary combination by some of the American states, and in 1992 the Ruding Committee 
summarily dismissed global formulary apportionment. It could be argued that, in the interim, globalization 
has increased the pressure on the use of separate entity and ALS to the point that many countries (especially 
those that lack the highly trained personnel required to implement the current rules) might be willing to 
consider an alternative, such as formulary apportionment. It seems clear that, at a minimum, the increased 
economic integration of Europe has caused the European Commission and some EU Member States to rethink 
their stand against formulary apportionment within the EU.” (Emphasis added.) See paragraph 315 of the 
OECD report entitled Are the current treaty rules for taxing business profits appropriate for e-commerce?, 
OECD public discussion draft (November 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/38/20655083.pdf
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Conversely, rules presuppose a relatively smaller number of well-trained policy-makers or 
government officials—those who have the responsibility of drafting (largely self-enforcing) 
rules.  
 
The six normative lessons derived from some of the Argentine and U.S. literature in the 
transfer pricing arena can be encapsulated in the following statement. In the area of 
frequent cross-border transactions, the ALS should be largely implemented by a procedural 
rule capable of producing a proxy of transfer pricing case law with public good features.  
 
IV- A Procedural Proposal for Solving the Transfer Pricing Problem 
 
This Part elaborates a proposal for solving the structural problem faced by the transfer 
pricing legal system in both the developed and developing worlds. The proposal is based on 
the normative lessons of the U.S. and Argentine experiences as reported above.  
 
The proposal is to harness the multilateral APA (APA) system to produce a proxy for case 
law with public good features in the transfer pricing area. It works as follows. A private 
good (e.g. a particular APA) is transformed into a proxy of case law via systematically 
making public each APA without revealing potentially sensitive confidential data.  
 
The confidentiality element is protected via two legal devices. First, the proposal grants the 
taxpayer the right to veto the transformation of her APA into a public good if she considers 
that her confidential data have not been properly deleted. Second, the proposal establishes 
that a mandatory time lag (e.g. three years) must elapse between the APA issuance and its 
publication. This time lag is functionally equivalent to that witnessed between the 
emergence of the facts that triggers a given litigation, and the publication of the decision 
that solves that litigation.  If the mechanism serves as an effective proxy for case law as 
intended, the meaning of the ALS will be clearer than it currently is given the lack of 
transfer pricing case law with public good features in both the developed and developing 
worlds.47 
In the early nineties, a multilateral APA similar to that suggested in the proposal was 
successfully issued to solve a transfer pricing problem relating to the global trading of 
derivatives and commodities. In the context of a multilateral APA among tax treaty 
partners, the U.S, the U.K. and Japan agreed to develop a profit-split formula for the 
allocation of income derived from the global trading of derivatives and commodities (APA 
 
47 Some commentators have stated, but not elaborated, the idea of using the APA system for providing 
relatively precise meanings to the ALS. For example, Richard Vann has argued the following: “[a]t the 
administrative level, the heavy compliance demands that the particularistic nature of transfer pricing creates 
may be ameliorated by the ongoing development of advance pricing arrangements (APAs) which are 
acknowledged and encouraged by the [OECD] guidelines. The potential here is that eventually precedential 
principles will emerge from the many different APAs that are issued. Such a development requires that the 
general content of APAs become public, which is already occurring to some degree. Once it is clear how tax 
administrations will treat particular fields of activity, taxpayers are likely to be inclined to follow the guidance 
as a way or reducing compliance cost and have more certainty of outcome.” See Richard Vann, Reflections on 
Business Profits and the Arm's-Length Principle, op. cit, at 168. See also Jinyuan Li, Global Profit Split: An 
Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation Vol 50, N° 3 Canadian Tax Journal 823-83 (2002).  
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on Global Trading).48 The contracting states considered that the agreed profit-split formula 
was consistent with the ALS as codified in Article 9.1 of the relevant OECD-based tax 
treaties.49 Finally, the Internal Revenue Service issued a notice with a summary of the 
multilateral APA on Global Trading without disclosing private information.50 That notice 
implies a step towards using the multilateral APA process for the production of a proxy of 
case law with public features in the transfer pricing area.  
 
If the proposal had been applied to the APA on Global Trading, the system would have 
worked as follows. The APA on Global Trading would have been transformed into a rule-
based norm (the new rule) by the competent authorities. And three years after the APA was 
produced, the new rule would have been incorporated into the domestic tax laws of the 
U.S., the U.K., and Japan, provided the taxpayer involved in the APA on Global Trading 
had not decided to veto the release of the norm on the grounds that her confidential data 
had not been properly removed.51 
Finally, the new rule could have been applied retroactively to open fiscal years to grant 
other qualified taxpayers the option of being governed by the new rule.52 Hence, the issue 
of the proposal’s potential inconsistencies with liberal democratic principles would have 
been minimized.53 
The proposal might be worded as follows in order to facilitate its addition to Article 9 of 
the OECD model:  
 
Contracting states can implement the arm’s-length standard via a system of rules 
regulated by this Article (the system of rules). The system of rules shall be so that 
the result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article.  
 
A person shall have the option of using the OECD transfer pricing guidelines as a 
default legal regime enforceable via bilateral or multilateral advance pricing 
agreements (APAs) only. The APA procedure shall be governed by Article 25. If the 
person accepts the APA concluded by the competent authorities, the APA will be 
final and not subject to further administrative or judicial review.  
 
48Libin, Jerome B., Formulary Apportionment for Global Trading in the Manufacturing Industry: Can It 
Work? Tax Notes Int’l, p. 1375 (Nov. 20, 1995). 
49 This position is consistent with the current OECD view according to which under some cir-
cumstances, a multifactor formula reflects the ALS. See OECD, Discussion Draft of the Attribution to 
Permanent Establishments (PES: Part III (Enterprises Carrying on Global Trading of Financial Instruments), 
paragraphs 157-160 (March 4, 2003), available at www.oecd.org. That report provides, inter alia, “guidance 
on how to apply the profit split method in accordance with the arm’s length principle, with particular 
reference to the multi-factor formula approach.” (See paragraph 160.) 
50 See Internal Revenue Service Notice 94-40, 1994-1, C.B. 351. It is published at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
apa/notice_94-40.pdf
51 There is no legal problem, as far as I can see, in having the same rule-based norm being incorporated in the 
domestic law of the relevant contracting states. 
52 Because the System of Rules, as defined by the proposal, is expected to be domestic-law-based, the option 
to be governed by the new norm includes those taxpayers who are not within the scope of tax treaty law. 
53 Diane Ring, note 17.  
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Every APA shall be transformed by the competent authorities into a rule (the new 
rule) without revealing any confidential data. The new rule shall be added to the 
system of rules three years after the APA is concluded. The said person is entitled to 
veto the addition of the new rule to the system of rules if he considers that his 
confidential data has not been properly deleted from the new rule. If he exercises 
this veto power, he will be unable to request an APA for a period of 10 years from 
the date the veto was exercised. The new rule shall have retroactive effect to open 
fiscal years to provide other qualified persons the option of being governed by the 
new rule. 
 
A- General Remarks 
 
1. Definition and Working of Bilateral or Multilateral Advanced Pricing Agreement  
An APA is an arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an 
appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, 
and critical assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for 
those transactions over a fixed period of time. An APA is formally initiated by a taxpayer 
and requires negotiations between the taxpayer, one or more associated enterprises, and one 
or more tax administrations.54 
The central difference between bilateral and multilateral APAs is the number of tax 
authorities involved (in addition to the taxpayer) in the transfer pricing dispute. In bilateral 
APAs, two competent authorities are involved; multilateral APAs involve three or more 
competent authorities.55 
The APA process is an alternative to the standard taxpayer practice of completing the 
transaction, filing a return, facing an audit (some level of audit is more likely with larger 
taxpayers), and, finally, a possible appeal of the audit with either settlement or litigation (or 
both). The taxpayer normally initiates the APA process by approaching the tax authority 
(and typically the corresponding tax authority in the other relevant jurisdiction) before 
engaging in the related-party transactions potentially at issue. At this point, the taxpayer 
voluntarily provides detailed information to the governments on its business activities, 
plans, competitors, market conditions, and prior tax circumstances. The critical piece of this 
presentation is the taxpayer’s explanation of its planned transfer pricing method. Following 
discussion and negotiation, the parties may reach an agreement on how the taxpayer should 
 
54 See OECD guidelines, 4.124. By the same token, an APA has been defined by the U.S. as an agreement 
between the tax authority and the taxpayer on the transfer pricing method. The APA can be applied to any 
apportionment or allocation of income, deductions, credits, or allowances between two or more organizations, 
trades, or businesses owned or controlled (directly or indirectly) by the same interests. See section 1 of the 
U.S. Rev. Proc. 96-53, IRB CB 96-49 (December 2, 1996). Similar definitions of APAs have been established 
in some other countries, such as Australia (section 10 of the ATO Taxation Ruling 95/23, on APAs) and 
Canada (sections 3 and 4 Revenue Canada Information Circular Number 94-4)). See Jose Manuel Calderon, 
Advance Pricing Agreements. A Global Analysis, Kluwer Law International (1998).  
55 For instance a multilateral APA was recently signed by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain 
for Airbus Industries. See Steven S. Saeger, Rahul Tomar and Deloris R. Wright, Comment on PATA 
Guidance for bilateral APAs, International Transfer Pricing Journal, 3-6, footnote 3 (January/February 2005). 
19
handle the pricing of those anticipated related-party transactions. The understanding is then 
embodied in the APA agreement which, in the U.S., typically lasts for three years.56 
In 1991, the APA system was first designed and applied in the U.S. It was then emulated by 
countries of different legal traditions. To date, the emulators include Australia, Canada, 
China, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom, and Venezuela.57 
2. Why Bilateral or Multilateral APAs Play a Central Role in the Proposal 
Representative transfer pricing litigation can be modeled as a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
between the taxpayer facing a transfer pricing adjustment, and the domestic tax authority 
(the first prisoner’s dilemma). Since the first prisoner’s dilemma is unsolved for certain 
strategic reasons explored below, both parties have the incentive not to cooperate by hiding 
information unfavorable to their interests. Thus transfer pricing litigation gives rise to 
asymmetries of information; this leads courts to produce case law which is a private good, 
rather than a public good, because it can only solve one case.   
 
A bilateral or multilateral APA can also be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma among two or 
more contracting states, rather than the taxpayer facing a transfer pricing adjustment and 
the local tax authority (the second prisoner’s dilemma). The second prisoner’s dilemma, 
unlike the first one, can be solved spontaneously by iteration if certain elements are present. 
 
A bilateral or multilateral APA has a central role in the proposal because, unlike litigation, 
it can spontaneously solve the prisoner’s dilemma which is pervasive in the transfer pricing 
context. Moreover, the transformation of APAs into a proxy for case law with public good 
features can arguably provide relatively precise ex ante guidance on the requirements of the 
ALS in the different factual scenarios in which the ALS is applicable. 
 
a- Transfer Pricing Litigation as an Unsolved Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a useful heuristic to illuminate the strategic interactions of the 
players involved in a representative transfer pricing litigation. Those players are the 
domestic tax authority and the taxpayer facing a transfer pricing adjustment. Both players 
typically have two alternative individual choices within that litigation framework: to defect 
or to cooperate. Both options can be defined as follows. 
 
First, to defect means using information strategically, such as hiding from the court 
unfavorable information. Second, to cooperate means providing the court all relevant 
information that helps the court produce case law with public good features. For example, 
 
56 Diane Ring, note 17. 
57 See Jose Manuel Calderon, note 17, at 9-11. The current features of APA procedures of OECD countries 
are outlined at the OECD Web site. See http://www.oecd.org/doc-
ument/31/0,2340,en_2649_37427_29601439_1_1_1_37427,00. html. See also China Issues Formal Advance 
Pricing Agreements Rules, Deloitte, http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/TP0504%281%29.pdf.
Strategy Matrix for Global Transfer Pricing, Deolite Touche Tomatsu (2004). 
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the cooperative strategy may imply the provision of information to the court that may be 
useful for applying a formula (such as the profit split) based on a compelling rationale 
rather than on arbitrary grounds. Case law based on a compelling rationale (rather than on 
arbitrary grounds) may be a good thing for both the taxpayer and the tax authority: it may 
be instrumental for minimizing international double taxation. 58 Indeed, it is more likely 
that local case law based on a compelling rationale will be shared by foreign competent 
authorities than that case law grounded on an arbitrary rationale because of its 
persuasiveness. Indeed, case law based on a compelling rationale would facilitate the 
working of, say, the secondary adjustment mechanism which minimizes the risk of 
international double taxation.59 In short, a critical by-product of the simultaneous 
cooperation of both parties is to help the court produce transfer pricing case law with public 
good features. 
 
The transfer pricing litigation game (i.e., the first prisoner’s dilemma) can be modeled as 
follows: 
 
Tax Authority 
 
Cooperate                             Defect   
 
Cooperate                 2,2                                         4,1 
Taxpayer  
 
Defect                       1,4                                         3,3 
 
Transfer Pricing Litigation as a Prisoner’s dilemma  
 
In the matrix above, both players may chose between two alternative outcomes labeled 
Cooperate or Defect.  This implies that there are four alternative outcomes represented by 
the four cells of the matrix. Each cell has a specific payoff structure for the players. In each 
cell, the first payoff goes to the taxpayers facing transfer pricing adjustment whereas the 
second payoff goes to the Tax Authority.  The numbers stand for the payoffs for each 
combination, ranked by an ordinal representation (thus, for each player 1>2>3>4). 
 
58 Transfer pricing case law based on arbitrary grounds is a frequent element in both the developed and 
developing worlds. For example, a commentator has argued the following: “The main problem with the profit 
split method as developed in [certain] cases is the lack of rationale for the court’s decisions. While the courts 
are careful to lay out the facts extensively, and the opinions are typically over a hundred pages long, in the 
end the actual profit split is not justified by an extended functional analysis of the roles performed by each of 
the parties.” See Reuven Avi-Yonah, note 18, at A-123. 
59 The secondary adjustment mechanism is regulated by Article 9.2 of the OECD Model.   
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The prisoner’s dilemma strategic interaction gives both players incentives to use 
information strategically. Defect is the strictly dominant strategy because it is the optimal 
choice for each player no matter what the other player does. 60 Hence, the equilibrium point 
in the prisoner’s dilemma situation is represented by the lower right cell (i.e., 3,3). 
 
The upper left cell (i.e. 2,2) is a Pareto efficient outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. This is 
so because the simultaneous cooperation of both players led them to provide the courts all 
available information that facilitates the production of transfer pricing case law grounded 
on a compelling rationale. The compelling rationale of local transfer pricing case law 
maximizes the likelihood that it will be accepted by all competent authorities of other 
relevant tax jurisdictions. Hence, the risk of international double taxation is minimized. 
 
As said, a critical by-product of the simultaneous cooperation of both parties is to help the 
court produce transfer pricing case law with public (rather than private) good features. 
Transfer pricing case law with public good features is crucial for offering precise ex post 
meanings to the ALS which minimizes uncertainty on how taxpayers (and tax authorities) 
are expected to behave in the transfer pricing area.  
 
The counterintuitive consequence of the prisoner’s dilemma game is that the spontaneous 
result of mutual defection (i.e., 3,3), which is the rational choice for each person considered 
individually, is Pareto-inferior to mutual cooperation (i.e., 2,2). That is, each player is better 
off if they both cooperate than if both defect because cooperation would facilitate the 
production of transfer pricing case law with a compelling rationale that would minimize the 
problem of international double taxation. But the dominant strategy is to defect because it is 
the strategy that earns each player a larger payoff than any other regardless of what the 
other player does. Thus, the players in a prisoner’s dilemma scenario are normally not able 
to spontaneously reach an equilibrium point in which both parties cooperate simultaneously 
(i.e., 2,2).   
 
Transfer pricing litigation is arguably similar to large commercial litigation because they 
both can be modeled as an unsolved prisoner’s dilemma. The dominant strategy of both 
pair of players normally is to defect by hiding unfavorable information.61 Indeed, lawyers 
involved in transfer pricing litigation (like those involved in large commercial litigation) 
have the incentive to build up a reputation of being difficult and obstinate, rather than 
cooperators.   
 
60 See Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economics, Chapter 1, Princeton University Press (1992). 
(maintaining that a given strategy is strictly dominant if it is the best choice for a player in a game for every 
possible choice by the other player. As said,, the non-cooperation strategy is strictly dominant for both players 
in a prisoner’s dilemma). 
61Ronald Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through agents: Cooperation and conflict between lawyers 
in litigation, 94 Colum L. Rev 509,5 40 (1994) (arguing that large commercial litigation can be modeled as 
unsolved prisoner’s dilemma).  
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Unfortunately, judges are typically unable to solve this type of prisoners’ dilemma. This is 
so because judges have difficulty verifying and sanctioning defection of the players. As has 
been argued in the context of large commercial litigation,  
 
[t]he information structure of the litigation game can explain the presence of significant 
conflict in litigation even though most lawyers claim to play tit-for-tat. Litigation is quite 
´noisy´. Clearly identifying whether the other side has cooperated or defected in a 
competitive environment where cooperation is defined as being not too conflictual, is quite 
often difficult.62 
A signal that transfer pricing litigation normally is an unsolved prisoner’s dilemma is the 
frequency with which courts complain about the lack of cooperation of both tax authorities 
and taxpayers in this area. The U.S. Tax Court has recently said:  
 
[W]e must say that our attempt to determine an appropriate arm’s 
length price...to a large extent has been stymied by the poor state of the 
record in this case. We found the record to be one more of obfuscation 
than enlightenment. The complexity of our task was exacerbated by the 
contentiousness of the parties. They at times seemed antagonist rather 
than adversaries. ... It is obvious to us that we were too tolerant with the 
parties during the pretrial proceedings. However, we must determine 
the appropriate arm’s length consideration ...on the record before us. 
Our task was not easy but we have shouldered the yoke, and the parties 
now must reap what they have sowed.63 
In short, a representative transfer pricing litigation can be studied as a one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma. Consequently, the parties of a transfer pricing litigation lack the incentive to 
provide the courts with all the available information critical for producing transfer pricing 
case law with public good features. This strategic scenario results in most current transfer 
pricing precedents being private goods: they are typically applicable only to the case at 
hand.64 
b- APAs as Solved Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Both transfer pricing litigation and APA can be framed as prisoner’s dilemmas modeled by 
the matrix studied in the previous section. However, there are two critical differences 
 
62 Ibidem. 
63 See Sundstrand, 96 T.C. at 374-75. See also Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson, Clearing Away the 
Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57 Tax L. Rev. 37 
(2003-2004) footnote 78.  
64 The following has been said on the pattern of reasoning developed in substantial U.S. transfer pricing case 
law. “The French, U.S. Steel and Bausch & Lomb decisions illustrate a major problem facing the courts in 
applying the 1968 regulations: If inexact comparables are used because the market has changed (French, B & 
L), or because the relationship between the parties makes for a different nature of transaction (U.S. Steel, 
B&L), the application of regulations leads to results that are unrealistic as an economic matter [...] Why, then, 
were the courts in these cases so eager to find that those ‘comparables’ were controlling?....The main reason 
was, as the courts themselves state, their awareness of the morass they would be getting into in the absence of 
comparables, which resulted in other cases in decisions that cover hundred of pages only to reach 
unpredictable and arbitrary results.” Reuven Avi-Yonah, note 18 at A-113.  
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between both prisoners’ dilemmas. On the one hand, the players of a transfer pricing 
litigation are a taxpayer and the tax authority, whereas the players of a representative APA 
are the relevant competent authorities –e.g. the US, the UK and Japan as the APA on 
Global Trading studied above shows. On the other hand, transfer pricing litigation normally 
is a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma that can not be solved for the reasons stated above. 
Conversely, the APA can be studied as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma that may be solved 
spontaneously. This section shows why a representative APA, unlike transfer pricing 
litigation, may be solved spontaneously without exogenous intervention.   
 
A prisoner’s dilemma problem can be spontaneously solved if it is played repeatedly 
(iterated prisoner’s dilemma). The iterated prisoner’s dilemma may lead players to develop 
cooperative behavior under the tit-for-tat rule, which means that players tend to start the 
game with cooperative behavior, defecting only if the other player has defected on the 
previous move.65 
Tit-for-tat emerges if certain conditions are met. They are the following: (i) the relationship 
between the players is perceived as durable; (ii) cooperation is based on reciprocity; and 
(iii) the players have the ability to identify defection when it occurs.66 That is, the player 
must have the ability to retaliate to the other party’s uncooperative move.67 The basic idea 
is that a player must not be able to get away with defecting without the other individual 
being able to retaliate effectively. One player must know what the other player actually did 
on the previous move because a tit-for-tat player always defects exactly once after each 
defection by the other player.68 If those conditions are met, an iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
may be solved spontaneously without exogenous intervention.  
 
The bilateral or multilateral APA is a procedural framework that, unlike standard transfer 
pricing litigation, can facilitate the emergence of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma in transfer 
pricing because the three elements listed in the previous paragraph may be met for the 
following reasons. First, the APA should allow the competent authorities of the contracting 
states to interact simultaneously in a given transfer pricing problem since they are expected 
to act at the same time. 
 
Second, the relationship among competent authorities should be perceived as durable if the 
proposed APA mechanism is included in the relevant tax treaty. Indeed, if the proposal is 
accepted, competent authorities will acknowledge that future interaction among them is 
likely.  
 
Third, cooperation among competent authorities should tend to be based on reciprocity. 
That reciprocity will probably emerge if the turnover of public officials involved in the 
APA process is relatively low.69 
65 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation (1984). 
66 Id. at 140.  
67 Id. at 29-182.  
68 Id. at 132.  
69 Ibidem. 
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Fourth, the APA framework should make the behavior of the competent authorities visible 
to each other. Thus, the competent authorities will have the ability to recognize defection 
when it occurs, triggering the tit-for-tat pattern of behavior referred to above.  
 
The lawyers participating in a given APA should have the incentive to develop a tit-for- tat 
pattern of behaviour when representing the interests of the competent authorities. Within 
the context of APAs, lawyers should be willing to build up a reputation of cooperation for 
two main reasons. First, lawyers will most likely be evaluated by the professional market 
according to the numbers of successful APAs they have been involved in. Second, the 
number of lawyers involved in bilateral APAs may be smaller that those involved in 
representative domestic transfer pricing litigation. The probability that lawyers consider 
themselves as repeated players is therefore higher in the bilateral APAs context than in 
domestic transfer pricing litigation. Thus tit-for-tat may emerge in the bilateral APAs 
scenario. This should be contrasted with transfer pricing litigation transpiring at domestic 
courts in which lawyers tend to be difficult and obstinate, as it is often the case in large 
commercial litigation. 70 
In sum, the proposed APA mechanism is arguably more capable than transfer pricing 
litigation to meet the two fundamental elements for triggering an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma: (i) increasing the frequency of repeated play between players (i.e. competent 
authorities as defined by Article 25.3 of the OECD model); and, (ii) sanction defection as 
soon as it occurs.71 
3. Why Treaty Law (rather than Domestic Law) is the Best Available Legal Framework 
for Implementing the Proposal  
 
The proposal has been written to facilitate its addition to Article 9 of the OECD model 
(rather than to domestic law) for two major reasons. On the one hand, the OECD model has 
been an effective legal device for signaling to both developed and developing countries 
how they are expected to behave in the international tax arena. That signaling power of the 
OECD model could be used to accelerate the importation of the proposal by OECD-based 
tax treaties. Moreover, the OECD-based tax treaty theoretical framework normally 
permeates over time into the domestic law of both developed and developing countries for 
certain reasons.72 
On the other hand, tax treaty law is typically less volatile than domestic tax law. That 
proposition is particularly applicable to the developing world, even in those developing 
countries with populist governments. For example, the Chávez administration has not 
abrogated any of Venezuela’s tax treaties so far. In sum, the proposal should be 
implemented via tax treaty law (rather than domestic law).       
 
4. Implementation of the Proposal: The Transitional Phase  
70 Gilson, note 61. 
71 Ibidem at 550 (arguing that both elements are crucial for solving prisoner's dilemmas via iteration).   
72 See Richard Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax in Tax Law Design and Drafting, 718-809 at 728 
(Victor Thuronyi ed., International Monetary Fund, 1998). 
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The proposal can be implemented in three phases. In phase I, MNEs should be granted the 
option of being governed by the OECD guidelines applied via bilateral or multilateral 
APAs only or to continue using the older transfer pricing regime. Phase II should be 
implemented three years after starting phase I. Phase II implies the start of the  process of 
including the new rules (created via the APA procedure) to the system of rules. In phase III, 
an organization, like the OECD or the American Law Institute, may spontaneously emerge 
with the goal of inferring general rules from the set of fact-specific rules of the system of 
rules. An example of a general rule might be a formula applicable to the allocation of 
income derived from global trading of derivatives.73 If phase III emerges at some point in 
time, the character of the ALS will effectively have migrated from a standard-based norm 
into a rule-based norm.  
 
The new rules regime can coexist with the old transfer pricing regime. For example, IRC 
section 482, its regulations, and case law can coexist with the set of new rules that the APA 
will gradually produce. The taxpayer should have the option of using the old regime or the 
system of rules. Over time, the older transfer pricing regime may fall into desuetude.  
 
5. Frequency of Reforms of the Transfer Pricing Legal Framework  
Since the proposed system of rules is based on the APA mechanism operating as a proxy 
for case law, and case law becomes less relevant over time, periodic updating of the 
proposed system would be desirable.74 The frequency with which the system of rules is 
updated will mainly be driven by the requirements of the taxpayer community. Taxpayers 
are ordinarily better informed than governments in identifying the scenarios in which a 
given transfer pricing regime will no longer prevent the emergence of international double 
taxation. Needless to say, the content of the new rules of the system of rules will be 
basically under the competent authorities’ control. 
 
6. Evaluating the Performance of the Proposal 
Two criteria should be used to evaluate the performance of the proposal. The first element 
is the effectiveness of the APA process in producing self-enforcing, rule-based norms 
functionally equivalent to transfer pricing case law. The benchmark of that evaluation 
system could be the ability of those countries that have not accepted the proposal to provide 
a relatively precise meaning of the ALS. The second element is the extent to which rule-
based norms provide a precise meaning of the concept of the ALS.  
 
7. Expected Affect of the Proposal on both Developed and Developing Countries  
73 See note 50. 
74 W. Landes and R. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 Journal of Law and 
Economics (1976) (arguing that the body of legal precedents is a capital stock that yields a flow of 
information services which depreciates over time as new conditions arise that were not foreseen by the 
framers of the existing precedents). 
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The proposal arguably benefits the interests of both developed and developing countries for 
two major reasons. First, the proposal aims to transform the unsolved, one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma that normally emerges in representative transfer pricing litigation between a 
taxpayer and a local tax authority into an iterated prisoner’s dilemma among contracting 
states in the context of a bilateral or multilateral APA. This transformation is desirable 
because the transfer pricing prisoner’s dilemma may be solved spontaneously via iteration.  
 
Second, the proposal may result in an increasing ratio of transfer pricing norms having a 
predominant rule-based (rather than a standard-based) feature. Those norms will be largely 
self-enforcing because violations of rules usually are more visible to public opinion than 
violations of standards.75 
Moreover, the self-enforcing character of rule-based norms arguably substitutes for human 
capital endowment which is relatively scarce in the developing world. Indeed, the proposal 
allows developing countries to use their scarce human capital endowments more efficiently 
than it would be the case under the current ALS. The proposal’s structure of incentives 
encourages contracting states to concentrate their best human capital endowment at the 
APA process stage, because it is the setting in which most new self-enforcing transfer 
pricing rules are effectively created. 76 
8. Can the Proposal Deter the Emergence of Avoidable Litigation (such as Glaxo)? 
 
Since 2003, a new wave of major transfer pricing litigation has emerged in both the 
developed and developing world.77 The Glaxo case is a case in point in the developed 
world.  The facts are as follows. After nearly a decade of effort to resolve its transfer 
pricing dispute with the IRS without having to go to court, the British pharmaceutical giant 
Glaxo decided it was time to litigate. The case was filed in April 2004 at the U.S. Tax 
Court. Before the dispute started, Glaxo attempted to conclude an APA with the IRS (as 
Glaxo’s main competitor had done). However, the IRS rejected the Glaxo APA petition 
without providing any reasons. The IRS decided to adjust the transfer prices concluded by 
Glaxo’s U.K. parent corporation and its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, and the litigation 
started. 78 
The Glaxo case involved three central issues. The first issue was the inherent difficulty of 
determining transfer pricing in the presence of high-profit intangibles. As manufacturing 
and the importance of national borders shrink, cross-border transfer of valuable intellectual 
 
75 Reinier Krakman & Bernard Black, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harvard Law Review 
1911 (1996) (arguing that violation of rules is more visible to public opinion than violation of standards. 
Hence, rules, unlike standards, normally are self-enforcing).  
76 See Schafer, Hans-Bernd, note 5. 
77 Since 2003, the Argentine IRS has adjusted the transfer prices of some of the largest MNEs based in 
Argentina. That decision caused the emergence of the largest transfer pricing cases in Argentine history. 
Unfortunately, the information available on those cases is less comprehensive than that available in the U.S. 
regarding the Glaxo case. 
78 Martin Sullivan, Economic Analysis: With Billions at Stake, Glaxo Puts U.S. APA Program on Trial, Tax 
Notes Int’l, p. 456 (May 3, 2004). 
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property within a single multinational is becoming increasingly common. Unfortunately, 
that is the type of transfer pricing issue that poses the greatest challenge to the arm’s-length 
method codified in section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. The reason is that 
intangibles by definition are unique; so it is always difficult — and frequently impossible 
— to identify transactions between unrelated parties involving the transfer of comparable 
intangible assets. Left with no other option, the IRS (as indicated in its deficiency notice) 
was forced in the Glaxo case to use an often unpredictable profit-split method.79 
The second issue was the efficacy and fairness of the APA program. What legal obligation 
does the IRS have to provide APAs to taxpayers? Does the program provide equal 
treatment to different taxpayers? How much equality should it provide? Is the APA 
program legally required to be fair? Has the APA program been too generous to some 
taxpayers? The APA program has been primarily an insiders’ game. APAs are confidential. 
Until recently, only current and former IRS officials or practitioners specializing in transfer 
pricing (often former IRS officials) were privy to the critical details of how the program 
operated.80 
The third issue was the potential political fallout. Recently there have been many reports 
implying that U.S. corporations do not pay “their fair share” of taxes. For example, a recent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report81 prompted an April 3 story in The 
Washington Post, “GAO Says U.S., Foreign Firms Escaped Income Tax.” The GAO cited 
“improper pricing of inter-company transactions” among the causes. Recent research 
appearing in the pages indicates82 that the IRS has allowed U.S. multinationals to shift an 
inordinate amount of profit to tax havens.83 
Cases like Glaxo could have been avoided if the proposed APA mechanism had been 
included in Article 9 of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty for the following reasons. In year one, 
SmithKline (then Glaxo’s main competitor) would probably have requested a bilateral APA 
under Article 25 of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty (rather than a unilateral APA under U.S. 
domestic law). That is because the bilateral APA would have provided SmithKline legal 
certainty on how its cross-border income would be allocated in both jurisdictions, 
according to the view of both the IRS and the U.K. Inland Revenue under Article 9 of the 
tax treaty. Three years after the issuance of the APA, the competent authorities would have 
transformed the APA into a new rule. The new rule would have been incorporated into both 
U.S. and U.K. domestic laws (the system of rules) without revealing SmithKline’s 
confidential data. SmithKline would have been provided an opportunity to veto the addition 
of the new rule to the system of rules if it had considered that confidential data had not been 
properly deleted from the new rule. Subsequently Glaxo (i.e. SmithKiline main competitor) 
could have requested to be governed by the new rule retroactively to open fiscal years.  
 
79 Ibidem. 
80 Id. 
81 Tax Administration: Comparison of the Reported Tax Liabilities of Foreign-and U.S.-Controlled 
Corporations, 1996-2000, GAO-04-358 (Feb. 27, 2004). 
82 “Economic Analysis: U.S. Multinationals Move More Profits to Tax Havens,” Tax Notes Int’l, p. 589 (Feb. 
16, 2004). 
83 Id.  
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The proposal could have contributed to avoiding the emergence of the three issues that 
triggered the Glaxo case. First, the proposal would have provided both contracting states 
and the taxpayer room for experimentation on how to allocate the income derived from the 
particular intangibles involved in that case. The legal framework would have been Articles 
9 and 25 of the U.K.-U.S. tax treaty. (As stated above, that kind of experimentation had 
already been successful in global trading and is consistent with the ALS codified by Article 
9 of the OECD model)84. Thus, the risk of emergence of the first issue could have been 
minimized. Second, because the core content of the APA granted to SmithKline would 
have been made public three years after its issuance, if some confidentiality concerns had 
been met, the second issue would probably have been avoided. Finally, the bilateral APA 
concluded by the IRS and the Inland Revenue would have provided a proper forum for 
discussing what should have been SmithKline’s “fair share of [U.S.] taxes.” The third issue 
could have also been minimized. Moreover, the case could probably have been solved in 
less than four years without litigation (instead of the 10 years, plus litigation time, that the 
Glaxo case has now consumed).  
 
In summary, the proposed APA mechanism is consistent with the main lesson emerging 
from the Argentine and U.S. experience on transfer pricing: in the area of frequent cross-
border transactions, the ALS should be basically implemented by a procedural rule-based 
norm capable of producing a proxy of transfer pricing case law with public good features.  
 
C. Commentary on the Paragraphs of the Proposal  
The purpose of this section is to explain the working and justify the rationale of each 
paragraph of the proposal. The proposal has been written to facilitate its addition to Article 
9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.
1- Paragraph One  
 
Paragraph 1 reads as follows:  
 
Contracting states can implement the arm’s-length standard via a system of rules 
regulated by this Article (the system of rules). The system of rules shall be so that 
the result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article.  
 
a. Justification of the Structure of the Proposal 
 
The proposal offers taxpayers two alternative legal regimes in transfer pricing: (i) a rule-
based regime, called the system of rules, regulated by paragraph 1; and, (ii) a standard-
based regime, named the default legal regime, regulated by paragraph 2. If a given taxpayer 
is not happy with the system of rules, she can request to be governed by the default legal 
regime, i.e., the OECD guidelines implemented via a bilateral or multilateral APA only.  
 
84 See Part IV.a. 
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The structure of the procedural proposal has a major purpose. As stated above, the lack of 
case law in transfer pricing currently makes the precise meaning of the ALS prospectively 
unknowable. The role of the proposed system of rules is to solve that problem given that 
each rule of the system of rules (which should have been inferred from APAs) is expected 
to provide a relatively precise meaning to the ALS that may be updated periodically. 
Hence, the system of rules is functionally equivalent to transfer pricing case law with 
public good features.  
 
The system of rules should be implemented by contracting states via domestic law.85 
Examples of norms that may be included in the system of rules are norms inferred from 
bilateral or multilateral APAs, such as the formula agreed by Japan, U.K. and the U.S. in 
the global trading of derivatives referred to above.86 
The interaction of the system of rules and the default legal regime is expected to produce a 
virtuous circle. It should contribute to periodically updating the precise meaning of the 
domestic ALS to the changing circumstances of the countries in which it operates.87 
The proposal assumes that, over time, most taxpayers will prefer the system of rules (rather 
than the default legal regime or the current domestic transfer pricing regulations) because 
the system of rules will have already produced the transfer pricing norms more frequently 
used by most taxpayers in a given jurisdiction. This effect is usually seen in any standard-
based area of the law with extensive case law, such as contract law. Indeed, areas like 
contract law are largely self-enforcing because case law has effectively transformed 
standard-based norms into rule-based norms.  
 
Finally, the proposal also assumes that a representative taxpayer will prefer the 
bilateral/multilateral APA procedure over litigation for obtaining certainty on the transfer 
pricing area. This assumption is based on the fact that the APA procedure as implemented 
by the proposal (unlike litigation) can protect confidential information effectively.88 
b. The Interaction of the Proposal with the International Tax Regime  
The proposal is consistent with the international tax regime as embodied by the network of 
OECD-based bilateral tax treaties because it introduces no changes to the ALS. The 
proposal only provides a procedural dimension of the ALS. Hence, the proposal is 
consistent with both Article 7 and 9 of the OECD model. 
 
c. Implementing the Proposal  
The system of rules should be implemented basically via administrative regulation (rather 
than statutory legislation) to make the system of rules readily responsive to the new rules 
periodically produced by the APA procedure. This responsiveness may facilitate the 
 
85 See Part IV.B.1.c. 
86 See note 50. 
87 On the depreciation of precedents over time, see W. Landes note 74. 
88 See Part IV.B.3. 
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emergence of the iterated prisoners dilemma referred to above because the parties´ behavior 
would be readily visible to each other.89 Current examples of that method of implementing 
the transfer pricing regime are the section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code and 
Article 14 of the Argentine income tax law. In both examples, the core of the transfer 
pricing regime is implemented via regulations (rather than through statutory provisions). 
 
The proposal might work better in practice if an arbitration clause is included in the 
relevant tax treaty because a credible threat of arbitration may induce the competent 
authorities to reach an APA within a reasonable period. That arbitration clause might be 
triggered at the discretion of the taxpayer if the competent authorities are unable to reach an 
APA within certain period. 
 
d- A Criterion for Accepting APA Requests: The Test of Frequency 
 
Taxpayers might request more APAs from competent authorities than those authorities can 
deliver in a timely way. The APA procedure may encounter congestion delays. 
 
One plausible way of addressing this congestion problem would be to set a priority list 
according to which the frequency of the transactions involved is a critical element for 
accepting APA requests. In other words, the competent authorities should prefer to address 
APAs requests involving frequent transactions over those that do not meet this test.   
 
The test of frequency is consistent with the theoretical framework according to which rules 
should be preferred over standards for those conduct that are frequent.90 If conduct will be 
frequent, the additional costs of designing rules –which are borne once- are likely to be 
exceeded by the savings realized each time the rule is applied.91 Interestingly, the criterion 
based on the frequency of transactions for accepting request of APAs is already used by 
U.S. regulations.92 
2- Paragraph Two  
Paragraph 2 of the proposal states the following:  
 
A person shall have the option of using the OECD transfer pricing guidelines as a 
default legal regime enforceable via bilateral or multilateral advance pricing 
agreements (APAs) only. The APA procedure shall be governed by Article 25. If the 
person accepts the APA concluded by the competent authorities, the APA will be 
final and not subject to further administrative or judicial review.  
a. Why the OECD Guidelines are Used in the Proposal  
89 See Part IV.A.2.b. 
90 See Part II.2. 
91 See Louis Kaplow, note 5.  
92 See #3 2005 TNT 86-3 IRS Chief Counsel Announces New APA Program Initiative (Section 482 -- 
Transfer Pricing) (Doc 2005-9445) (May 04, 2005). 
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The rationale for granting taxpayers the option of using the OECD transfer pricing regime 
is based on the following reason. The OECD guidelines are the most detailed set of 
recommendations currently available on how to apply the ALS as codified in Article 9 of 
the OECD model. Because most countries reproduce the language of Article 9 of the 
OECD model in their tax treaty network, it seems reasonable to incorporate the OECD 
guidelines in the suggested proposal as a way of making the meaning of the ALS as precise 
as possible. Austria and Venezuela, for example, have already transformed the OECD 
guidelines into domestic regulation.  
 
b. Why APAs Should Only Be Bilateral or Multilateral (rather than Unilateral)  
Making the OECD guidelines applicable only through bilateral or multilateral APAs has 
three grounds. First, the bilateral or multilateral APA as a procedural method is more likely 
to be effective than the unilateral APA for preventing international double taxation because 
the positions of all tax jurisdictions involved in a given case can be represented in the same 
procedural setting.  
 
Second, because an APA is bilateral or multilateral (rather than unilateral) and the identity 
of the public officials involved in each APA will be in the public domain, the proposal 
should minimize agency costs like corruption of public officials. Moreover, because every 
APA should be transformed into a public rule, the chances of providing powerful taxpayers 
an unjustifiably favorable regime should be reduced. 
 
Third, APAs may create a suitable environment for experimentation in transfer pricing 
because the information asymmetries faced by APA players are relatively lower that that 
faced in transfer pricing litigation. Indeed, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma referred to 
above, unavailable in transfer pricing litigation, may induce contracting states to behave 
cooperatively in the APA context.  
 
c. What Are the Legal Grounds for Bilateral and Multilateral APAs?  
Because most effective tax treaties include the mutual agreement procedure, with wording 
similar to that of Article 25 of the OECD model, it seems reasonable to refer to Article 25 
as the legal ground for implementing the bilateral or multilateral APA.93 Moreover, there is 
 
93 Article 25 of the OECD model states the following: “Mutual Agreement Procedure: 1. Where a person 
considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies provided by the 
domestic law of those States, present his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which he 
is a resident or, if his case comes under paragraph 1 of Article 24, to that of the Contracting State of which he 
is a national. The case must be presented within three years from the first notification of the action resulting in 
taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 2. The competent authority shall endeavor, 
if the objection appears to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to 
resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other Contracting state, with a view 
to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accordance with the Convention. Any agreement reached shall be 
implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of the Contracting States. 3. The competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts 
arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. They may also consult together for the 
elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention. 4. The competent authorities of the 
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international consensus, backed by the OECD, that bilateral and multilateral APAs are 
governed by Article 25 of the OECD model.94 
The public officials involved in the APA procedure should be the competent authorities of 
the contracting states within the meaning of Article 25 of the OECD model. That role will 
allow them, for example, to produce APA decisions inconsistent with domestic law if this 
is necessary to comply with the ALS.95 
d. OECD Guidelines and Statutes Period of Limitations  
In order to promote legal certainty, taxpayers should be granted a relatively short period for 
choosing the OECD guidelines (rather than the system of rules). For example, taxpayers 
might be granted 15 working days from the date the relevant transaction is legally binding 
under domestic law to choose to be governed by the OECD guidelines. If no decision is 
made within this period, it shall be presumed iuris et de iure that the taxpayer wishes to be 
governed by the system of rules.  
 
e. Construing the OECD Guidelines: Static versus Ambulatory Approaches96 
For familiar reasons complex treaties, such as tax treaties, are likely incomplete as to 
unforeseen contingencies. Tax treaties are, in a certain sense, incomplete contracts. States 
may then benefit from various public international law devices to fill the gaps in their 
agreement. As in the literature on default rules for private contracts, it seems reasonable to 
argue that default rules (such as those provided for the Vienna Convention) should be 
applied to tax treaties in such a way as to replicate what the contracting states would have 
negotiated expressly if they had addressed the matter.97 
The method of interpretation of the OECD guidelines should be correlated to the character 
of the contracting states involved in each particular APA. If only developed countries take 
part in a given APA, the ambulatory interpretation seems to be the best available option 
because their views are normally represented in the periodic updating of the OECD 
guidelines.  
 
Conversely, it seems reasonable to infer that the OECD guidelines should, in principle, be 
construed on the basis of the static method of interpretation (rather than an ambulatory one) 
 
Contracting States may communicate with each other directly, including through a joint commission 
consisting of themselves or their representatives, for the purpose of reaching an agreement in the sense of the 
preceding paragraphs.” 
94 See OECD guidelines and Jose Manuel Calderon, note 17. 
95 This proposition assumes the rule, which is effective in most jurisdictions, according to which tax treaty 
law preempts domestic law under.  
96 For the definition of dynamic and static interpretation of tax treaties, see Philip Baker, Double Taxation 
Conventions. A manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention of Income and on Capital, Table of Treaties, 
Conventions and Agreements, from E-15 to E-18, Sweet and Maxwell Tax Library (October 2003). 
97Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (forthcoming in A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics). 
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given that developing countries do not normally participate in the updating of the OECD 
guidelines.98 In other words, the static method of interpretation should govern in the case of 
asymmetric tax treaties, unless there are compelling reasons to believe that in a particular 
tax treaty the parties would have preferred the ambulatory method if they had addressed the 
matter.99 This principle of interpretation is based on the conviction that to hold otherwise 
would imply that developing countries’ contracting states would lose control of the content 
of their own international obligations.   
 
f. Default Regulation of APAs  
Those aspects of the APA which are regulated by neither the relevant tax treaty law nor 
domestic legislation should be regulated by customary public international law. This is 
because international tax law is, to a large extent, customary public international law.100 
Consequently, the OECD guidelines might be relevant in the context of APAs if there are 
reasons to consider those guidelines to be customary public international law.101 
g. APA and Judicial Review  
The last sentence of paragraph 2 states that “if the person accepts the APA concluded by 
the competent authorities, the APA will be final and not subject to further administrative or 
judicial review.”  
 
Because Article 25 of the OECD model grants taxpayers a narrow role in the production of 
the APA, the APA cannot automatically be considered binding. That binding effect may 
emerge only if the taxpayer accepts the APA. The wording of that sentence of the proposal 
has been borrowed from section 12.05 of the U.S. Rev. Proc. 96-13. Finally, judicial and 
administrative review on the APA should be narrow for legal certainty reasons.102 
3-Paragraph Three  
Paragraph three reads as follows:  
 
Every APA shall be transformed by the competent authorities into a rule (the new 
rule) without revealing any confidential data. The new rule shall be added to the 
system of rules three years after the APA is concluded. The said person is entitled to 
 
98 The OECD is increasingly responsive to non-member countries´ views on the OECD model without losing 
control of the model’s content. For example, in 1991 the Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted the concept of 
an ambulatory Model Tax Convention. It also decided that because the influence of the Model Tax 
Convention extended far beyond the OECD member countries, the ongoing process through which the Model 
Tax Convention would be updated should be opened up to benefit from the input of non-member countries. 
Only 25 non-OECD member countries are participating in this process. Most of them are developing 
countries. See Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Condensed Version, OECD, at 343-374 
(July, 2005).     
99Thus, e.g., additions to the OECD guidelines made after a given tax treaty is concluded, in principle, should 
be ignored for identifying the precise meaning of the ALS.  
100 Avi-Yonah, Reuven, International Tax as International Law, in 57 Tax L. Rev. 483 (2004). 
101See OECD guidelines, IV-41 to IV-53. 
102 Administrative or judicial review should only be available for procedural issues of a given APA. 
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veto the addition of the new rule to the system of rules if he considers that his 
confidential data has not been properly deleted from the new rule. If he exercises 
this veto power, he will be unable to request an APA for a period of 10 years from 
the date the veto was exercised. The new rule shall have retroactive effect to open 
fiscal years to provide other qualified persons the option of being governed by the 
new rule.  
a. Balancing Public with Private Interests  
Paragraph three has been designed to balance three competing interests that may emerge if 
the proposed APA mechanism is adopted.  The interest of governments is to transform an 
APA (private good) into a rule-based norm (public good).  The interest of taxpayers is to 
avoid having confidential information reach the public domain (secrecy interest); and 
finally, the contracting states’ duty to respect the principle of horizontal equity under which 
all similarly situated taxpayers should be treated alike (horizontal equity interest). 
 
The balancing of these conflicting interests is implemented by paragraph three as follows. 
The transformation of the private good (i.e. APA) into a public good (i.e. new rule) should 
be done to use the new rule a vehicle for communicating to the taxpayer community the 
precise meaning of the ALS in the particular set of facts involved in each APA procedure. 
However, paragraph three offers the taxpayer the right to veto the publication of the new 
rule if the confidential information has not been properly excised from the new rule. 
 
Paragraph three has been designed with the purpose of inducing the taxpayer not to veto the 
addition of the new rule to the system of rules. That is the reason why the taxpayer is 
penalized if she exercises her veto power. Moreover, the taxpayer may be granted a 
monetary incentive if she does not exercise the said veto power. This monetary incentive is 
justified on the grounds that the taxpayer would be involved in the creation of a public 
good: a rule that provides an ex-ante meaning to the ALS. The monetary incentive might 
take the form of a right of making tax deductible (with a cap) the costs incurred by the 
taxpayer in the APA process.103 
b. Balancing Accountability and Discretion  
The taxpayer’s secrecy concern interest is protected through a three-pronged mechanism: 
(i) the three-year delay in transforming the private good into public good;104 (ii) the 
governments’ duty to make this transformation without revealing private information of the 
involved taxpayer;105 and, if the previous two mechanisms fail, (iii) the taxpayer’s right to 
veto the publication of the new norm. However, the exercise of that veto has a cost for the 
taxpayer. She will be unable to request a new APA for a considerable period.106 Thus, it is 
 
103 I am grateful to Robert Cooter for the idea of tax deductibility of APA expenses. 
104 This time gap seeks to protect the privacy of information by manipulating the timing of the new norm’s 
publication. It is expected that the time gap may provide enough protection to intangibles (such as software) 
which are normally subject to rapid depreciation. 
105 The new norm should not be precise enough to make the identity of the taxpayer involved in the APA 
process (and its confidential data) knowable to an intelligent layperson. 
106 The taxpayer’s decision to veto the inclusion of the new norm to the domestic law implies a cost to her. It 
seeks to deter her from exercising her veto power. This deterrence is justified on the following grounds. As 
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assumed that the taxpayer will decide to veto the new norm only after having made a cost-
benefit analysis. That analysis is facilitated by paragraph three because it provides the 
precise cost that the veto decision would imply for the taxpayer.107 
Finally, the horizontal equity interest is protected via the retroactive application of the new 
norm. Each qualified taxpayer may request, if some conditions are met, to be governed by 
the new norm during open fiscal years only to avoid, inter alia, administrative problems in 
enforcing that norm retroactively. 
 
In sum, paragraph three of the proposal offers a method for balancing three conflicting 
interests in transfer pricing: confidentiality, horizontal equity, and discretion for 
experimentation within the limits of the ALS as defined by the OECD Guidelines. 
 
C- Superiority of the Proposal to other Options for Simplifying the Transfer Pricing 
Problem 
 
This section argues that the procedural proposal is superior to other options for solving the 
transfer pricing problem because it is the best equipped for being applied in both the 
developed and developing worlds.  
 
In order to demonstrate this proposition, this section presents three major alternative 
regulatory options and identifies their weaknesses vis-à-vis the procedural proposal. Those 
options are the following: (i) the ALS as currently embodied in the OECD model; (ii) the 
formulary apportionment at the sub-national levels as implemented in Canada and the U.S.; 
and (iii) the formulary apportionment at a regional level, as suggested by the European 
Commission for the European Union. 
 
1-The ALS as currently embodied by the OECD Model 
 
The ALS as currently embodied in Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model faces a structural 
problem in both the developed and developing worlds. As said, it does not work properly 
because domestic courts are normally unable to produce transfer pricing case law with 
public good features. This problem is triggered for a variety of reasons including strategic 
ones that are explored above. Hence, the meaning of the ALS is largely unknowable in both 
the developed and developing worlds. 108 
2- Formulary Apportionment109 
said, one of the main goals of the proposal is to transform Advance Price Agreements into a proxy for case 
law. This transformation is prevented each time the veto is exercised.   
107 The taxpayer is not expected to explain why he or she has decided to veto the new norm. That will keep 
the enforcement cost of the proposal as low as possible. 
108 See Part II. 
109 This section closely follows Joann Martens Weiner, Company Tax Reform in the European Union: An 
Analysis of some Key Issues under Formulary Apportionment and Consolidated Base Taxation, (October 
2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
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The basic goal of formula apportionment is to assign income to the locations where a 
multinational enterprise conducts its business activity. The apportionment is implemented 
on the basis of a formula, rather than the ALS. The apportionment formula normally has 
elements, referred to as “factors,” which represent the shares of business activity in each 
location.  
 
Formulary apportionment is used at the sub-national level in both the U.S. and Canada. 
Moreover, the European Commission has recently proposed that the formulary 
apportionment should be used at a supra-national level: the European Union. 
 
a. The Approach of Canada and the US 
 
Canadian Provinces and U.S. States that tax corporate income apply a multifactor formula 
for the apportionment of income for tax purposes. For example, the Canadian Provinces 
apply a payroll and gross receipts formula with equal weights to each factor. This formula 
determines provincial profits as follows:  [½ (payroll in province/total payroll) + ½ (sales in 
province/total sales)] * total profits. This formula would work as follows. Suppose a 
Canadian corporation conducts its business activities in two Canadian provinces: Province 
A and Province B. It generates a total income of $1000.  Total payroll is $5000 ($3000 in 
Province A, and $2000 in Province B). Total gross receipts are $ 8000 ($ 6000 from 
Province A, and $2000 from Province B). The tax base would be allocated $ 675 to 
Province A, and $ 325 to Province B.110 
b. The Approach of the European Commission 
 
The European Commission recently set forth its new strategy in corporate taxation in the 
European Union (EU). This new long-term comprehensive strategy argued in favor of two 
key changes in how the individual Member States would tax EU multinational enterprises. 
First, instead of computing their tax base under the rules in each individual Member States, 
EU companies would have the option to use a single set of tax rules to compute a common 
tax base at the EU level. Second, these enterprises would distribute this tax base across 
individual Member States where they did business using an agreed common apportionment 
formula. Consistent with preserving Member State sovereignty in direct tax matters, the 
individual Member States would apply their own local tax rate to their apportioned share of 
the single consolidated EU tax base.  
 
c. The Assumptions of Formula Apportionment 
 
Formulary apportionment is workable only if certain elements are present in the relevant 
tax jurisdictions. Those elements are common accounting standards, common currency, and 
a common formula. It presupposes common accounting standards because they normally 
provide a uniform definition of concepts like payroll, sales, and profits which are crucial for 
the workability of the formula. It also presupposes a common currency in order to avoid 
problems like currency exchange rates. Finally, it presupposes a common formula for self-
 
110 Province A [ ½ (3/5) + ½ (6/8)] * 1000: $ 675. Province B [ ½ (2/5) + ½ (2/8)] * 1000: $ 325.  
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evident reasons. If all these elements are not present simultaneously in all relevant tax 
jurisdictions, formula apportionment can not work properly.  
 
Unfortunately, those elements are not simultaneously present in the developed and 
developing world. In effect, there are neither world-wide accepted accounting standards nor 
common currency. Moreover, there is no internationally accepted formula for allocation of 
cross-border income. The likelihood of reaching a world-wide consensus on these elements 
in the foreseeable future is low given the high collective action cost involved: there are over 
250 countries. Hence, formulary apportionment is unworkable at a global scale until 
elements such as those listed above are met.    
 
The proposal appears superior to both formulary apportionment and the substantive 
dimension of the ALS. This superiority is grounded in two major reasons. First, the 
proposal faces less collective action cost problems than those faced by formulary 
apportionment. The relevant players interacting within the proposal framework do not have 
to share common accounting standards, currency and formula as it is usually the case in the 
formulary apportionment scenario. Second, the proposal, unlike the ALS as traditionally 
defined, does not presuppose a network of domestic courts able to produce case law with 
public good features. Indeed, the proposal itself is expected to produce a proxy for this kind 
of case law. In sum, the proposal seems better equipped than formulary apportionment and 
the substantive dimension of the ALS for working in both the developed and developing 
worlds.   
 
3- Some Doubts and Difficulties             
 
This section identifies some objections that may be made to the proposal suggested in this 
Article. And it offers a response to them.  
 
(a) It may be maintained that the proposal is unworkable in practice. This is so, the 
argument goes, because it will not be possible to infer rule-based norms from APAs given 
that transfer pricing problems normally are substantially fact-specific.  
 
Certain standards are relatively costly to transform into rules because of, inter alia, the 
limits of language. An example of this type of cases is the meanings of “immoral 
behavior”. Indeed, it is difficult to state the set of immoral behavior precisely and 
succinctly. 111 The application of the proposal should not face problems such as those 
emerging from the attempt to define immoral behavior precisely and succinctly. The 
multilateral APA case on global trading of derivatives and commodities referred to above is 
a case in point. Indeed, that multilateral APA involved a substantial number of facts. 
However, the U.K., U.S., and Japanese competent authorities that participated in that APA 
case were able to agree on a rule-based norm to solve that transfer pricing problem: a 
formulary apportionment tailored to global trading of derivatives and commodities.112 
111 Kaplow, note 5. 
112 See note 50.  
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(b) It may be argued that the proposal will have no relevance in the interaction among 
developing countries in the transfer pricing area given that to date there have been no APAs 
concluded among developing countries. 
 
It is correct to maintain that there is no APA concluded in the transfer pricing arena 
between developing countries as of 2006. The current prisoner’s dilemma in the context of 
foreign direct investment among developing countries may explain this status quo. The 
structure of international taxation does not militate in favor of developing countries 
engaging in cooperative behaviors such as those required for concluding multilateral APAs.  
 
However, the proposal itself may be instrumental for solving this prisoner’s dilemma 
spontaneously in the context of transfer pricing via iteration. Alternatively, other solutions 
may be implemented in ways that facilitate the success of the procedural proposal.113 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This Article focuses on the problem of transfer pricing from an international taxation 
perspective. It elaborates two major points using game theory as a theoretical framework.  
 
First, it argues that both developed and developing countries are facing the same 
fundamental problem in the transfer pricing arena; the meaning of the arm’s length standard 
(ALS) is increasingly unknowable because of the absence of transfer pricing case law with 
public good features.  
 
Second, this Article proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem within the ALS 
legal framework. The proposal consist of a procedural, rather than a substantive, system in 
which multilateral advance pricing agreements are used in such a way as to produce a 
proxy of case law with public good features.  
 
The procedural proposal is arguably superior to other options (such as the formulary 
apportionment and consolidated base taxation elaborated by the European Commission in 
2001) because it can be applied by both developed and developing countries and is 
consistent with the current structure of international taxation. The proposal has been written 
to facilitate its addition to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital.  
 
113 For example, Reuven Avi-Yonah has made a proposal for solving the said prisoner’s dilemma. See Avi-
Yonah, Reven, Globalization and Tax Competition: Implications for Developing Countries (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author) (arguing that there are three elements necessary for solving the prisoner’s 
dilemma;.first, all OECD member countries should agree on a coordinated basis to tax their multinationals 
currently on their income from abroad; second, passive income held by non-resident taxpayers should be 
subject to withholding taxation by OECD countries, unless the relevant taxpayer proves that she has provided 
her country of residence information regarding her income; and finally, a world tax organization should be set 
up for monitoring the enforcement of the said proposals).   
